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Expanding or Diluting Human Rights?: 
The proliferation of United Nations Special Procedures mandates. 
Rosa Freedmani and Jacob Mchangamaii   
 
Abstract 
The United Nations Special Procedures system was described by former UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan as ‘the crown jewel’ of the UN Human Rights Machinery. Yet, in recent 
years the system has expanded rapidly, driven by states creating new mandates frequently on 
topics not traditionally viewed as human rights. This article explores the connection between 
forms of governance and the states voting for and promoting these newer mandates. We 
explore states’ potential motivations for expanding the system and the impact on international 
human rights law. The article forms an important part of discussions about Special 
Procedures and about rights proliferation. 
Keywords  
United Nations; Special Procedures; human rights; politicization; state governance.    
 
1 Introduction  
In recent years the issue of ‘human rights proliferation’ has emerged as a topic of discussion 
among human rights academics, diplomats and activists. Human rights proliferation refers to 
the increasing number of treaties, resolutions, bodies and institutions that focus on human 
rights.  The United Nation’s Human Rights Council’s adoption of ever more Special 
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Procedure mandates significantly contributes to these developments. The Special Procedures 
system has existed for nearly five decades, and at the time the Human Rights Council was 
created in 2006 there were 41 mandates. As of August 2014 an additional 10 mandates have 
been adopted. As Ted Piccone and Marc Limon have noted, if the current trajectory of the 
adoption of Special Procedure mandates is upheld there will be 100 mandates in 2030.iii  The 
proliferation of Special Procedure mandates raises questions of whether they strengthen 
human rights protection and promotion through increasing awareness and widening the scope 
of topics to be included under the umbrella of human rights, or whether expansion weakens 
the system by diluting core rights, reducing resources available to mandate holders, and 
providing a smokescreen for states seeking to avoid scrutiny of their record on fundamental 
human rights.  
One way of answering those questions is to investigate the voting records on Special 
Procedures to determine whether they reveal a pattern on how states vote on and advance 
different categories of thematic mandates. The purpose of our research is to explore whether 
forms of governance and states’ human rights ideologies are linked to the types of rights that 
they have promoted or supported through the vehicle of Special Procedures mandates. 
Empirical research on states’ voting records is used to analyse the broader issues and patterns 
that are ongoing across the UN Human Rights Machinery. Finally, we use the research 
findings to support analysis of states’ potential motivations for their strategies vis-à-vis the 
type of rights they promote when voting for Special Procedures. The research that we have 
undertaken on this one specific part of the UN Human Rights Machinery is part of broader 
ongoing debates about how best to address the potential problems and pitfalls of rights 
inflation.  
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2 Background: Human Rights Categories and Ideologies 
In order to investigate whether there is a link between the countries at the fore of rights 
proliferation and state governance, and to understand the impact this has on the international 
human rights law system, it is crucial to understand the three categories of human rights. 
Vasak talks about three generations of rights based on the French principles of liberté, 
egalité and fraternité.iv He links CPRs to liberty; ESCRs are connected to equality through 
social justice; and TGRs, also known as solidarity or collective rights, embody the idea 
of fraternity.v The first two categories of rights are well explored, although the categories are 
not always water tight: Civil and Political Rightsvi focus on fundamental freedoms and civil 
liberties of the individual and were historically linked with liberal democracies and the rule of 
law. Economic, Social and Cultural Rightsvii often focus on states’ positive obligations to 
provide, or to provide access to, certain services or standards. TGRsviii are the newest, and 
therefore least established, set of rights that generally involve a collective element and benefit 
for society but have yet to be codified into legally binding treaties.  
It is somewhat crude to categorise every human right according to these three 
generations, but the categories provide a useful tool for understanding the ideologies 
underpinning different types of rights. Different forms of governance and governmental 
ideologiesix affect the development of rights. Indeed, the Universal Declaration was 
subsequently codified into two conventions split between CPRsx and ESCRsxi, owing, inter 
alia, to resistance to one or other category by countries ideologically opposed to those types 
of rights.xii That relationship between types of governments and human rights has continued 
despite many states formally committing to the principle of the interdependence, 
interrelatedness and indivisibility of all rights.xiii  
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The UN’s official position is that the sets of rights are equal, overlap and are 
interdependent and indivisible – that is, they cannot exist without each other.xiv Since the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action at the 1993 World Conference on human 
rights, the ‘indivisibility’ of all human rights has been a cornerstone of the international 
human rights movement. The concept of indivisibility highlights that all rights are interwoven 
within a general framework of international human rights law, and that one category of rights 
cannot fully be realized without the implementation of the other set.xv However, it is not clear 
from state practice at the national level or indeed from voting records at the HRC that the 
concept of indivisibility is an accurate reflection of how states actually view and approach 
human rights. As we shall see there is a significant difference in how regional groups and 
political blocs support or place greater emphasis on different categories of rights.  
Countries such as China and the US make clear their human rights ideologies through 
their ratification of human rights treaties. China, on the one hand, is not party to the ICCPR
xviii
xvi 
while the US is not party to the ICESCR. Other countries have adopted a more intermediate 
position, with an increase in states including ESCRs in their constitutions as well as a greater 
willingness of judiciaries to enforce such rights. However, the majority of states – including 
many liberal democracies – do not have ESCRs in national constitutionsxvii, and those that do 
often differentiate between the status that they afford to ESCRs and CPRs . Regional 
human rights such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-American 
focus overwhelmingly on CPRs.xix Although ESCRs have more recently been added into the 
EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, the Charter offers a more robust protection of CPRs than 
ESCRs. The differences between the legal status of CPRs and ESCRs are significant, but they 
are far less pronounced than the differences between those two categories of rights and 
TGRs. Unlike CPRs and ESCRs, TGRs have yet to be codified in a legally binding treaty and 
are unclear in terms of normative content. This is demonstrated by the difficulties faced by 
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the UN Human Rights Committee and regional organisations when addressing alleged 
violations of such rights. Indeed, relatively few states have sought to enshrine and uphold 
such rights, and when they have the rights have been framed within national constitutions as 
individual as opposed to collective rights, as is the case with the right to peace in Costa 
Rica.xx  
International human rights law is developed, promoted and protected at the universal 
level through the UN Human Rights Machinery. From an idealist perspective, as a universal 
organisation the UN is best placed to develop, monitor and protect rights across all regions 
and countries. That machinery includes a universal body – the Human Rights Council – 
treaty-based bodies, Special Procedures mandate holders and the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. Although the scope and jurisdiction of each body varies, 
the interrelationship between them enables effective monitoring, fact-finding, 
recommendations and technical assistance for states in relation to different human rights 
obligations. In order to examine the expansion of international human rights standards, we 
focus on one aspect of that machinery - the Special Procedures system. 
Special Procedures is a system of independent experts appointed for fixed terms to 
examine either human rights generally within a specific country or one thematic right across 
the world. Mandates are almost exclusively created by states members of the Human Rights 
Councilxxi, which means that such processes are shaped as much, if not more, by political 
than by legal objectives. Mandate holders are independent both of the United Nations and of 
their sending states and, at least in theory and in the majority of cases, are experts either on 
human rights generally or on a specific aspect of IHRL. Mandate holders promote human 
rights through monitoring, fact-finding reporting and providing recommendations. They 
undertake country visits and engage with non-state actors, national human rights institutions 
and victims of violations. Although countries choose whether or not to allow mandate holders 
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into their territories, the role of Special Procedures is an intrusive one as they very publicly 
present their findings as to weaknesses in states’ compliance with human rights. 
 
3 Methodology  
When examining countries’ voting records, a number of factors are relevant including 
membership of regional groups, state alliances, vote trading and foreign policy 
considerations. While it is difficult to assess how much each factor contributes to a given vote 
in the Human Rights Council it is clear that state alliances in particular play a crucial role in 
the UN human rights machinery, often providing strong vehicles for collectively promoting 
human rights ideologies.  Alliances are based on regional and political connections. States 
with similar forms of governance are frequently allied through regional groups, political 
blocs or both. The Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC) regional group largely 
consists of states with weaker democracies often owing to a recent history of military rule 
within many of those countries. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a political 
bloc, has many members with dictatorial or autocratic regimes or countries that only very 
recently, since the beginning of the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011, have seen public uprisings and 
movement towards democracy. The Western European and Others Group consists of liberal 
democracies and there is a significant overlap between membership of that regional group 
and membership of the European Union political bloc. Forms of government and their 
ideologies play a crucial role in the political alliances between states. The growth in number 
and power of states from the Global South has resulted in a significant shift in world politics 
with the result that those countries, groups and blocs are now able to dominate proceedings 
within most international institutions. That ability to dominate means that those countries are 
able to promote and impose their own political ideologies and objectives within those fora.  
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The impact of regional groups and political blocs has been documented by legal 
scholars xxiii
xxvii
xxii and political scientists  and those alliances have used various tactics to promote 
their own objectives on human rights.xxiv The current composition of the Human Rights 
Council, with proportionate geographic representation, results in the African and Asian 
Groups together holding an overall majorityxxv, and the political alliances of developing 
states through the Non-Aligned Movementxxvi and Islamic countries through the OIC  
dominate proceedings. The predominant forms of governance within, and types of national 
interests typically pursued by, states members of those groups and blocs necessarily impact 
upon the emphasis that the Council places on particular types of rights. This has been 
demonstrated in particular through the Council’s creation and renewal of Special Procedures 
mandates and the manner in which there has been a shift away from focusing on CPRs owing 
to the proliferation of ESCR and TGR mandates over the past two decades. What we are 
concerned with, however, is the form of governance within each state supporting or 
promoting each type of right.  
3.1 Categorising States’ Governance 
In order to assess the impact of ideologies on the thematic rights that Special Procedures 
mandates are created to promote and protect, it is necessary to identify different forms of 
governance within states. It is therefore necessary to look at various methods for categorising 
individual states. One method, adopted by Lebovic and Voetenxxviii, is to use Political Terror 
Scale values issued by the State Department of the United Statesxxix. Although those scores 
carry significant weight when ranking countries, they are of greater interest to a US, rather 
than a global, audience. Similarly, using European Union assessments of individual states 
might limit the applicability of, or at least interest in, this study. We deemed it most 
appropriate to use a generally-accepted ranking system created and deployed by an 
established NGO.  
 8 
Freedom House
xxxii
xxx has long provided rankings based on states’ governancexxxi, which 
is directly applicable to this research. Although some criticism has been levelled against that 
organisation , it is widely-esteemed and oft-cited. Freedom House divides all states into 
categories of ‘Free’, ‘Partly Free’ and ‘Not Free’ based on observance of civil and political 
rights. Obviously this categorisation is based on liberal democratic ideology, which places 
emphasis on that particular category of rights. As will be shown, countries classified as Free 
(F) are, at least nominally, liberal democracies from across the world; Partly Free (PF) 
countries include a broad range from near fully-fledged to emerging democracies; while Not 
Free (NF) states are governed by autocratic, dictatorial and repressive regimes.  
Freedom House conducts annual ‘comparative assessments of global political rights 
and civil liberties’xxxiii
xxxiv
 and determines country rankings based on scores collectively grouped 
into those three categories. Countries are evaluated on both political rights and civil liberties, 
with scores given out of 7. The combined scores for free countries are between 1 - 2.5; partly 
free countries score between 3 - 5; and not free countries score between 5.5 - 7. A country’s 
ranking is not necessarily static; several countries have had their rankings changed over the 
years, depending on the prevailing political climate at any given time. Similar categorisation 
has occurred from other institutions, such as The World Bank , which also seek to break 
down state institutions according to governmental indicators (including human rights 
compliance) in order to compare, measure and classify forms of governance. Using those 
categorisations, we can loosely term these states ‘liberal democracies’ (F), ‘emerging 
democracies’ (PF) and ‘autocratic or repressive regimes’ (NF).  
Human rights ideologies are intrinsically linked to the national government and form 
of governance. There are political as well as governance reasons for countries’ human rights 
ideologies. Not Free and Partly Free governments are less likely to adhere to CPRs than Free 
states. The form of governance of NF states itself often is maintained by violating CPRs such 
 9 
as the freedoms of assembly, association and expression and in particularly oppressive 
countries, violations will also include systematic torture and deprivation of the right to life. 
Our aim is to explore how those different forms of governance impact upon the development 
of human rights at the international level. Our methodology does not allow us to establish 
causality in patterns between type of governance and voting record, yet any correlation can 
be indicative of a significant relationship especially if supported by other factors pointing in 
that direction.  
 
3.2  Categorising The Mandates   
As previously discussed, Special Procedures is comprised of individual mandates that focus 
either on a specific country or on a thematic right. Although thematic mandates may cover 
different human rights obligations, they largely can be divided according to the three 
categories of rightsxxxv: Civil and Political Rights (CPRs); Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ESCRs); and Third Generation Rights (TGRs). Those categories of rights are useful 
for exploring the expansion of Special Procedures over the past twenty years and for 
understanding the potential motivations of states for creating newer mandates. 
When categorising the mandates we look first at whether the specific mandate relates 
to a right in an existing human rights treaty covering a particular category. Thus for instance 
freedom of expression and opinion is protected by Article 19 ICCPR and the Special 
Procedure Mandate relating thereto should therefore clearly be categorized as CPR, whereas 
the right to ‘the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ 
can be found in Article 12 ICESCR and the SPR mandate thereon should therefore be 
labelled as an ESCR one. Certain other thematic mandates are more difficult to categorize 
especially since TGRs are not defined and have yet to be codified in international law. It 
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should also be noted that certain mandates might take into account both aspects of CPRs and 
ESCRs.xxxvi  
 
3.3  Mapping the Data 
Empirical research on states’ voting records regarding Special Procedures mandates enables 
us to determine which states are promoting CPR, ESCR and TGR mandates respectively. The 
research focuses on voting records for Special Procedures thematic mandates created under 
the former Commission on Human Rights and its successor body the Human Rights Council. 
Each mandate has at least one resolution creating the mandate and all bar the newest ones, 
such as Freedom of Assemblyxxxvii xxxviii
xxxix
 and a Democratic and Equitable International Order , 
or those that have been discontinued  have resolutions renewing the mandates. Generally, 
thematic mandates are renewed every three years, although some have a shorter period of 
duration specified in the original resolution creating the mandate. The Council considered all 
mandates as part of its Review, Rationalisation and Improvement processxl, and therefore 
renewed the mandates as part of the transition from Commission to Council regardless of 
whether a mandate’s term of duration had expired. 
It must be noted that the original resolution creating a mandate is often more 
contentious, in terms of the debates surrounding the resolution and the vote, than occurs for 
subsequent renewing resolutions. This may be a case of countries not wishing subsequently to 
revisit previous discussions and debates. Occasionally a renewing mandate is contentious in 
terms of discussions and votes but this often occurs where countries, groups or blocs seek to 
alter the mandate, as occurred with the 2008 renewing resolution on Freedom of 
Expression.xli That mandate was created in 1993xlii and had been in existence between then 
and 2008. In that year, Canada proposed the renewing mandate. The OIC tabled an 
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amendment that called for an additional operative paragraph requiring the mandate holder to 
examine instances where ‘the abuse of the right of freedom of expression constitutes an act of 
racial or religious discrimination’.xliii
xlvii
xlviii
 This was clearly targeted at an ongoing objective of 
creating a new right for people not to have their religion defamed.xliv That issue had been 
raised elsewhere including at conferences and within UN bodies. Canada, in light of the 
broader context in which the amendment was tabled as well as the fundamental impact that it 
would have on the right to freedom of expression, raised considerable objections to the 
amendment.xlv It insisted that the amendment would fundamentally change the mandate 
holder’s role from promoting to policing the exercise of freedom of expression.xlvi Countries 
like Slovenia, Brazil and India, alongside the usual Western states, asserted that this 
amendment would restrict the very right that the mandate sought to protect and promote.  
The mandate was adopted with the amendment despite the debate surrounding that renewing 
resolution.  By 2011 and the mandate’s next renewalxlix, the countries that opposed the 
amendment did not seek to repeat the 2008 discussions, which demonstrates the inference 
that states choose not to re-engage in previous battles once they have clearly been lost.  
In order to determine which states promote and support different type of mandates we 
examine voting records on the mandates. That analysis includes which countries sponsored 
resolutions owing to that being an indicator of promoting rather than just supporting. The 
mandate on Toxic Dumping, for example, had a significant number of sponsors (thirty-nine) 
that included twenty-nine African countries. It is fairly clear why African states promoted this 
mandate, as that region is the one most affected by toxic dumping.l The mandate on 
countering terrorism, on the other hand, was sponsored by sixty-eight countries most of 
whom were not affected by the issue. However, countering terrorism was a significant 
political issue. Countries from the EU, GRULAC and some additional ones from WEOG 
were the main promoters of this mandate. Perhaps more interestingly, Egypt and Russia also 
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sponsored the resolution. Both of those countries had their own internal political objectives 
regarding terrorism alongside foreign policy objectives based on US involvement with 
violations of CPRs while countering terrorism.  
Although any country may sponsor a resolution, only members of the Human Rights 
Council may vote. It is important to note that a country may not be involved in a resolution if 
it is neither a Council member nor a sponsor, and that a lack of involvement does not in and 
of itself lead to any conclusions about that state’s stance on the mandate. Not all resolutions 
are adopted by vote – where there is consensus there is no voting record per se, but it is clear 
that no state felt strongly enough to call for a vote in which they could register their 
abstention or disagreement with the mandate. Often such mandates are on issues that are 
universally recognised as crucial human rights, even if countries systematically violate those 
rights within their own territories. Examples include the mandates on the Sale of Children, 
Child Prostitution and Child Pornographyli, Arbitrary Detention,lii Violence Against 
Women,liii and Contemporary Forms of Slavery.liv  
Countries may abstain from the vote, which in itself can be quite telling. Abstentions 
are a method of registering non-acceptance of a particular provision or of the need for a 
mandate even if a country agrees with the right itself. That occurred during the vote on the 
2008 renewal resolution for the mandate on freedom of expression and opinion; countries that 
supported the right but not the alteration of the mandate abstained during the vote in order 
neither to undermine the mandate nor to support the tabled amendment.lv  
When looking at votes and sponsors we used Freedom House’s categorisation of F, 
PF and NF for the particular year of the resolution. We identified how many F, PF or NF 
states voted for, against or abstained in the vote on each resolution.  States such as Brazil, 
India, Indonesia and Ukraine saw their classification change over time and this then alters the 
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numbers of F, NF and PF states on the Commission/Council. Also it must be noted that with 
elections every year, a third of the Council’s members change and therefore there is always a 
difference in terms of the numbers of members with different types of governance sitting on 
the body. Geographic proportionate representation at the Council means that thus far there 
has almost always been a majority of NF and PF combined, but there is not always a majority 
of any one category of governance.  
 
3.4  Research Findings  
Special Procedures focused almost exclusively on CPRs until 1995 when the Commission on 
Human Rights created a TGR mandate on Toxic Dumping.
lviii
lvi Since then, there has been a 
movement towards expanding the system to include ESCRs and TGRs adding some 12 ESCR 
mandateslvii and 4 TGR mandates.  It is important to note that these figures do not so-called 
hybrid mandates introduced since 1995, namely Human Rights of Migrants, Minority Issues, 
and Discrimination of Women in Law and in Practice. Mapping the data enables us to assess 
the extent to which forms of governance impacts upon states’ approaches to the expansion of 
the system. 
The first two ESCR mandates were on Poverty
lxiii, starting with Migrants in 1999
lix and Educationlx, both created in 
1998. Between 1995 and 2013, 5 TGR mandates and 12 ESCR mandates have been adopted.  
In that time there have been 4 new CPRs as traditionally understoodlxi, starting with Impunity 
in 2004lxii. There have also been 8 mandates lxiv, where the 
resolution largely seeks to promote and protect CPRs but only in relation to a specific group 
of people. The types of mandates have changed and expanded rapidly over almost 20 years. 
The purpose of our empirical research is to explore whether the system’s expansion has been 
impacted by the type of governance within states that have been at the fore of promoting or 
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supporting new mandates. The impact of those newer mandates will be explored in Section 5. 
Various reasons and motivations might be inferred from those actions, as will be explored in 
Section 6.  
 
3.5  Empirical Data on Voting Records 
The data we have used is from 1980 to the end of 2013. Of the 19 CPR mandates
lxvii
lxviii
lxv, 4 
resolutions creating the mandates were adopted by a votelxvi. On average 20 F countries, 9 PF 
and 5 NF voted for the resolutions; 0 F countries, 0 PF and 2 NF voted against; and < 1 F 
countries, 2 PF and 6 NF abstained . As a percentage of the vote, on average 58 percent F 
countries, 15 percent PF and 27 percent NF voted for the resolutions; and 7 percent F 
countries, 26 percent PF and 67 percent NF abstained. No PF states voted against a CPR 
mandate . Of the remaining 15 mandates adopted without a vote, on average 24 F 
countries, 9 PF and 4 NF sponsored the introduction of the resolutions. It is clear from this 
data that F countries are far more likely to promote or support CPR mandates than both PF 
and NF states.  
For the 12 ESCR mandateslxix, 6 resolutions creating or renewing the mandates were 
adopted by a votelxx. On average 16 F countries, 13 PF and 12 NF voted for the resolutions; 7 
F countries, 0 PF and 0 NF voted against; and 2 F countries, 2 PF and < 1 NF abstainedlxxi. 
As a percentage of the vote, on average 35 percent F countries, 33 percent PF and 32 percent 
NF voted for the resolutions. No PF or NF countries have ever voted against the creation of 
an ESCR mandate. Of the remaining 5 mandates adopted without a vote, on average 20 F 
countries, 8 PF and 5 NF sponsored the introduction of the resolutions. Thus while F states 
have been marginally more likely to support ESCR mandates than PF and NF states they 
have also been by far the most likely to oppose and vote against such mandates. This suggests 
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that F states’ attitude towards ESCR is mixed and very much dependent on the specific nature 
of the right in question, whereas PF and NF states seem to view all ESCRs as priority.  The 
difference in data between CPR and ESCR mandates is clear; NF and PF states are far more 
likely to promote or support ESCR than CPR mandates. F countries are often supportive of 
ESCR mandates but are also more likely to vote against or abstain on ESCR than CPR 
mandates. 
For the 5 TGR mandates,lxxii
lxxiii
 3 resolutions creating the mandates were adopted by a 
vote.  On average 7 F countries, 14 PF and 12 NF voted for the resolutions; 13 F countries, 
< 1 PF and < 1 NF voted against; and 2 F countries, 2 PF and < 1 NF abstained. As a 
percentage of the vote, on average 21 percent F countries, 43 percent PF and 36 percent NF 
voted for the resolutions; 93 percent F countries, 5 percent PF and 2 percent NF voted 
against; and 31  percent F countries, 29 percent PF and 40 percent NF abstained. The data 
again shows ideological divisions between forms of governance and types of mandates that 
states promote or support. NF and PF states are more likely to push for TGR mandates 
whereas F states overwhelmingly register dissent through voting against the resolutions. 
 
4. Analysis  
Our research findingslxxiv show that Free states will almost always support and almost never 
vote against CPR mandates, whereas their record on ESCRs is more mixed and the record on 
TGRs shows that F states are decidedly skeptical about this new generation of rights.lxxv Not 
Free states are most inclined to vote for TGRs and, to a lesser extent sponsor ESCR 
mandates, but rarely promote CPRs even though they do at times vote for those mandates. 
Partly Free states are most inclined towards TGRs but also do promote and support ESCRs. 
Although it is not appropriate here to explore all of the relevant mandates and voting records, 
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it is interesting to demonstrate these findings with reference to particular resolutions and to 
the countries that promoted or sought to undermine different mandates. This will inform and 
illustrate our analysislxxvi of these research findings. 
The 2000 resolution on the CPR mandate of Human Rights Defenderslxxvii
lxxviii
lxxix
 was 
adopted by 50 votes in favour,  0 against and 3 abstentions - China, Cuba and Rwanda, all 
three NF states with poor records of implementing rights for Human Rights Defenders.  
Unsurprisingly, given its own record of harassing and imprisoning human rights defenders, 
China asserted that the mandate was unnecessary, claiming that Human Rights Defenders 
were adequately protected by other mandates thus rendering the new mechanism obsolete.lxxx 
The Cuban delegate went further, insisting that the mandate was not necessary owing to:   
‘[T]he guise of “human rights defender” was often assumed by those who were bent 
on subversion. In Cuba, the United States subcontracted so-called human rights 
defenders to channel extensive funding to subversives.’lxxxi            
The CPR mandate on Freedom of Association was adopted in 2010lxxxii
lxxxiii lxxxiv
lxxxv
lxxxvi
lxxxvii
lxxxviii
lxxxix
 without a vote. What 
is interesting about this mandate is that there were 63 co-sponsors: 47 F , 15 PF  and 1 
NF . During discussions about the resolution statements made by NF states demonstrated 
their strength of feeling against the mandate. During discussions, a number of NF countries 
that did not sponsor the resolution made statements that sought to undermine the mandate. 
China asserted that the right contained non-absolute obligations and that the mandate should 
take into account differing opinions, particularly of developing countries.   Russia, Libya 
and Pakistan all insisted that mechanisms such as CERD  and the International Labour 
Organisation already adequately addressed the substantive issues covered by the 
mandate.  They argued that the new mandate would simply further reduce funding and 
resources for Special Procedures and the Council.  This is an interesting point to note 
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owing to the ongoing discussion about whether TGRs and some ESCRs mandates were being 
created simply to dilute rather than enhance the Special Procedures system.xc Cuba, mirroring 
its stance on the mandate on human rights defenders, expressed its opposition to the mandate 
by arguing that some of the co-sponsors  
‘criminalise the movements of national liberation that fought against colonialism and 
apartheid [and funded] activities in other countries that are unconstitutional . . .  some 
of the co-sponsors have xenophobic parties who are racist in nature . . . who have 
organisations that fight against the dignity of other human beings.’xci 
The ESCR mandate on Extreme Poverty was created in 1998
xciii
xcii and adopted with 51 votes 
in favor and 1 against. The votes in favor demonstrate participation across the board, with 25 
F , 16 PFxciv and 10 NFxcv. The US was the only country to vote against this mandate, 
citing ‘budgetary concerns’ as its reason for not supporting the mandate.xcvi That vote can be 
interpreted in light of the US approach to ESCRs; the vote may be viewed as ideological, 
particularly owing to this being the first ESCR mandate and therefore the first opportunity for 
the US to promote its ideology within the Special Procedures system. Opposition to the 
mandate can also be understood in light of the mandate’s substance not falling directly within 
the prism of human rights. Indeed, the mandate holder’s reports and activities have largely 
focused on financial institutions and programs at the national, regional and international 
levels.  
The ESCR mandate on Foreign Debt created in 2000xcvii
xcviii
 proved more contentious 
than the one on Extreme Poverty. 30 countries voted for the mandate , 15 againstxcix and 7 
abstained.c 6 Fci, 14 PFcii and 10 NFciii voted for the mandate, while all 15 countries opposing 
the countries were F and came from the EU and its regional allies in WEOG. The same bloc 
voting occurred in the renewal resolutions in 2008civ and 2011cv; a North-Southcvi divide is 
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clear regarding this mandate. During discussions on the 2008 resolution, the EU expressed 
unease with the mandate claiming ‘pontification of minimum standards’.
cviii
cvii In 2011 the US 
asserted that the Council is ‘technically incompetent’ to address issues like foreign debt, and 
that ‘rules other than human rights laws are more relevant’.  These comments are crucial 
for understanding opposition both to this mandate and to the more general expansion of 
Special Procedures to include so-called rights that focus on other areas than ones traditionally 
associated with human rights and that often lack support in binding treaties. The concern was 
also raised that such a mandate would shift focus and funds away from other more pressing 
and serious human rights violations.cix 
The TGR mandate on International Solidarity was created in 2005.cx  The preamble to 
mandate sets out that it:  
‘Recognizes that the so-called “third-generation rights” closely interrelated to the 
fundamental value of solidarity need further progressive development within the 
United Nations human rights machinery in order to be able to respond to the 
increasing challenges of international cooperation in this field.’cxi 
Cuba introduced the resolution by saying that it is ‘aimed at promoting the recent 
development of the rights of the third generation, such as the right to peace, the right to 
development and the right to a healthy environment.’
cxiii
cxvii
cxii The voting patterns on the resolution 
creating the mandate and the two renewal resolutions  show clear bloc voting. WEOG 
consistently voted against these resolutionscxiv, while GRULAC, which has a significant 
representation of PF statescxv, voted in favorcxvi. The EU insisted that Special Procedures 
ought to focus on the duties of states to their citizens rather than of states to other states.  
During discussions on the 2011 resolution, the EU argued that the moral nature of the concept 
of international solidarity makes it difficult to transform it into a legally valuable and binding 
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human right.cxviii It argued that the lack of clear definition of the entitlements of the right-
holders and responsibilities of the duty-bearers means that the so-called right risks being 
redundant.cxix  
The TGR mandate on a Democratic and Equitable International Order was created in 
2011 cxxii cxxiii
cxxiv
cxxvi
cxxvii
cxxviii
cxxix
cxxxi
cxxxii cxxxiii
cxx. It was adopted by 29 votes in favorcxxi, 12 against  and 5 abstentions . The 
abstentions largely came from Latin America  while EU and WEOG once again voted 
against this mandate. PFcxxv and NF  states account for 23 of the 29 votes in favor. During 
discussions on the resolution, Cuba introduced the mandate as based on a need for 
international cooperation for realization of ‘economic and social advancement of all 
peoples’ . The EU asked for an amendment that also focused on democracy at a national 
level and plurality of political parties, as well as insisting that the mandate should focus on 
freedom of expression.  The EU insisted that such amendments would at least make a 
contribution to human rights , echoing previous concerns that such mandates are far-
removed from the human rights matrix.cxxx Cuba responded by accusing the EU of bad faith, 
politicization and double standards.  Similarly, when the US voiced concerns about the 
mandate , Cuba responded by accusing the US of genocide of indigenous people  as 
opposed to addressing the substance of the issues raised. 
Alongside analyzing votes on the mandates, the research charts the voting records of 
individual states. Although this analysis goes beyond the scope of this particular article, there 
are interesting differences between voting patterns of states with the same category of 
governance. Within the Free category, Canada uses its vote to take a demonstrative stance 
supported by ideological comments during discussions. Brazil takes a different approach, 
generally voting in favor of all rights. Canada is strongly allied with WEOG countries and 
has been known to take a liberal ideological stance at the Human Rights Council.cxxxiv To a 
large extent, Brazil is the F representative of the Global South and its voting record can be 
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understood accordingly. Within the PF category, Nigeria can be contrasted with Mexico. The 
two countries’ regionalcxxxv cxxxvi
cxxxvii
cxxxviii
cxxxix
 and political  alliances arguably have influenced their voting 
records, with Mexico abstaining on several occasions  on issues more likely to impact 
upon Nigeria and/or its allies . In the NF category, Cuba and Russia have taken different 
approaches to Special Procedures despite supposed similarities between their political 
ideologies.  Cuba has been at the fore in terms of championing TGRs and fits well within 
the general analysis on NF states. Russia tends instead to vote with its political allies but has 
voted with WEOG on mandates such as Toxic Waste and Human Rights Defenders, which 
implies that there are broader political objectives underlying its voting record. 
 
Impact of mandate proliferation 
The research findings set out above demonstrate that some countries with poor human rights 
records, and which are classified as PF or NF, are among the active drivers behind the 
proliferation of rights expanding the focus of mandates from a more narrow focus on CPRs to 
ESCRs and also TGRs. 
Many ESCR mandates undoubtedly were introduced and voted for out of genuine 
concern about the very real and pressing problems of international concern such as global 
poverty, inequality, food crisis and the stark differences in living standards between 
developed and developing countries. However, the significant differences in voting patterns 
between F, PF and NF as well as the examples of how specific PF and NF states have utilized 
ESCR and TGR mandates (explored in more detail below), suggest that a minority of active 
states have more mixed or outright nefarious agendas when it comes to mandate proliferation. 
By inflating the number and scope of human rights addressed by mandate holders the focus 
of Special Rapporteurs will often be less critical and violations oriented. 
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Despite the formal UN wide agreement on the ‘indivisibility’ of all human rights, the 
nature of ESCRs and in particular TGR mandates is often very different from CPR ones. CPR 
mandates tend to have a more narrow focus and deal with rights whose normative content are 
relatively well-established, where gross and systematic violations are immediately apparent 
and identifiable and closely associated with authoritarianism and thus much more likely to 
cause embarrassment, scrutiny and condemnation. Despite detailed general comments, an 
increase in national constitutions with justiciable ESCRs and the adoption of an optional 
protocol to the ICESCR, ESCRs tend to be more abstract and identification of individual 
violations are often less clear cut than when it comes to systematic violations of CPRs. In the 
words of Emilie M. Hafner-Burton ‘there is no consensus on how exactly to measure these 
violations [of ESCRs]’cxl.  
Outside of situations where governments forcibly withhold foodcxli, engage in 
systematic discrimination or adopt policies of large scale forced evictions, it is often much 
more difficult to determine when ESCRs have been violated and what government policy or 
(in)action caused poverty, housing crises or food shortages. Moreover, governments accused 
of violating ESCRs will often be able to argue that resource constraints hinder them from 
fulfilling these rights, and because most states do in fact spend resources on education, health 
and housing, governments will often be able to point to accomplishments that can be used to 
demonstrate commitment to ESCRs and which in turn invites praise from both Special 
Procedures and other states.  
TGRs differ from both CPRs and ESCRs in often placing states or peoples rather than 
individuals as right holders as well as being drafted in a very vague and unclear manner with 
no immediately clear normative content and thus little opportunity for Special Rapporteurs to 
identify and expose gross and systematic violations. This development also means that 
mandate holders are required to address matters falling outside of the human rights matrix 
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and thus beyond their expertise. Secondly, mandate holders face difficulties in assessing 
compliance with the substantive rights. There is no method for assessing whether a state 
complies with the right to international solidarity or just international order – those rights are 
not enshrined in existing legally binding conventions nor are they properly defined. 
Accordingly there seems to be little substantive merit to these types of TGR mandates. CPR 
mandates, on the other hand, focus on rights such as freedom of expression, religion, 
assembly, and association, which are more easily definable and therefore it is often more 
clear when states violate them in a systematic fashion. 
The mandate on Foreign Debt is one example of the contrast between TGR and other 
mandates. The Foreign Debt mandate holders have undertaken fifteen country visits during 
the thirteen-year duration of the mandate.cxlii Almost all CPR mandate holders undertake at 
least three if not more country visits per year. Indeed, prior to the creation of the Council, 
some mandate holders conducted many more visits. Country visits enable fact-finding, 
monitoring and dialogues with national human rights activists and victims of violations. With 
the expansion of Special Procedures and the dilution of available resources, the number of 
country visits has been reduced for all mandate holders. Despite this, a ratio of 0.6 visits per 
year is significantly lower than almost all other mandates. The mandate holder on Foreign 
Debt struggled to convince states of the need, or even ability, to monitor and fact-find within 
their territories. The vague and broad provisions within the mandate, coupled with the lack of 
tangible victims owing to ill-defined so-called ‘rights’, made both country visits and reports 
more or less meaningless and devoid of impact. This demonstrates the extent to which the 
mandate on Foreign Debt is misplaced, at best, or even redundant within the human rights 
matrix. Yet the mandate draws logistical, research and other support from OHCHR and 
requires time to be devoted to it during Human Rights Council sessions. Moreover, it shifts 
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the focus away from tangible victims of tangible rights, and therefore it is clear why such a 
mandate is attractive for states seeking to dilute or undermine the system. 
It is important to explore not only the increasing numbers of mandates and which 
states support or promote mandates on different types of rights, but also how states then use 
those mandates to pursue their own political objectives. Once created, these newer mandates 
have significant impact not only in terms of changing the nature of what constitutes a right 
but also in terms of enabling states to avoid their obligations to uphold traditional rights.  
In order to understand the practicalities of this broader impact we shall explore how 
mandate holders on certain CPRs, ESCRs and TGRs have been received by the state that 
exemplifies the politicized motives for the proliferation of mandates. As previously 
discussed, Cuba is responsible for introducing six new thematic mandates, all of which 
address ESCRs or TGRs. From the outset, this activity could be interpreted as evidence of a 
deeply held Cuban commitment to human rights and their effective protection through the 
UN system. Yet, as we have seen in terms of Cuba’s approach to the mandate on human 
rights defenders and as we shall explore further, Cuba’s approach to and relationship with 
Special Procedures is a lot more complicated than suggested by the number of mandates it 
has introduced.  
In the 1990s Cuba allowed the visits of the Special Rapporteurs on Mercenaries and 
Violence against Women, but ignored a request and two subsequent reminders from the 
Special Rapporteur on Independence of Judges and Lawyers. In 2002 The Secretary General 
appointed a Personal Representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
situation of human rights in Cuba. Yet Cuba never recognized the mandate nor did Cuba 
allow the representative access to the country. In 2007 a majority of the HRC decided to 
discontinue the country specific mandate on Cuba. In 2006 Cuba ignored a request from the 
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Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion and in 2011 it ignored a request from the Special 
Rapporteur on freedom of association and assembly. In 2009 Cuba agreed to a visit by the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture yet the Special Rapporteur had to send a reminder in 2013 and 
the visit is yet to be carried out. Yet in 2007 for the first time in 8 years Cuba accepted a 
request from a Special Procedures mandate holder, namely the Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food,cxliii
cxliv
 a mandate created through the sponsorship of Cuba. That Rapporteur 
held several meetings with high level members of the Cuban government and issued a report 
to the HRC which generally praised Cuba’s human rights record on the right to food and 
refrained from mentioning or criticizing the Cuban government’s systematic violations of 
civil and political rights .  
Accordingly, while Cuba has been supportive of and willing to cooperate with 
mandate holders on ESCRs and TGRs it has often voted against CPR mandates and 
systematically refused cooperation with Special Rapporteurs on CPRs
cxlvi
cxlv. There is also some 
evidence of rights proliferation creating ‘cross-fertilization’ between SPRs and the Universal 
Periodic Review. Thus in 2013 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea encouraged Cuba 
to ‘[p]romote the development of third generation rights, in particular the value of 
international solidarity.’  Of course the mandate on International Solidarity was introduced 
by Cuba.  
It is not just Cuba that uses ESCR and TGR mandates for political objectives 
unrelated to or that undermine human rights. There are countries that commit egregious 
violations of CPRs but use ESCR and TGR mandates as a smokescreen to divert attention 
away from those gross and systemic violations. Such states welcome in ESCR and TGR 
mandate holders and then point to positive reports as ‘evidence’ of their human rights 
‘commitment’. Syria provides a clear example of such behavior. In the summer and fall of 
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2010, less than a year before the uprisings against Bashar Al-Assad that would set off the 
current bloody civil war in Syria, the Special Rapporteurs on the right to foodcxlvii
cxlviii
 and health 
respectively were invited to visit Syria. These mandate holders met with several members of 
the Syrian government and issued report that were generally praising the human rights 
records of Syria but were silent on the repressive nature of the regime . The Special 
Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health stated that: 
‘Syria’s commendable work in the last three decades to improve the health system as 
a whole, and its commitment to ensure access to healthcare for all” with regard to 
concerns the Special Rapporteur “noted with dismay that smoking is still highly 
prevalent in Syria’.cxlix    
Prior to the visit of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food the Special Rapporteur on 
Torture had three requests for visits in 2005, 2007 and 2010 ignored, whereas the Special 
Rapporteur on human rights defenders had two requests in 2008 and 2010 ignored. Syria has 
also ignored requests from the Working Group on arbitrary detention and the Working Group 
on enforced disappearances, whereas agreements were made with the Special Rapporteurs on 
summary executions and Internally Displaced persons as well as with the Working Group on 
Mercenaries yet none of these agreements have been honored.  
The significant differences in voting and sponsorship between F, PF and NF states 
suggest that Special Procedures mandates are no longer being used solely to protect and 
promote human rights. Instead, that system has become yet another political and ideological 
battleground upon which F, NF and PF countries seek to further their own objectives. The 
constant enlargement of the subject matter of thematic mandates, particularly TGR ones, has 
shifted the focus from protecting tangible rights of tangible victims of abuses and onto using 
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the human rights matrix to address broader and more abstract issues only tangentially related 
to human rights and often ill-suited for voicing criticism of particular governments abuse of 
specific citizens. 
Mandate proliferation also has a significant impact on the technical and logistical way 
in which the Special Procedures system operates. As we have seen the Special Procedures 
system has expanded rapidly over the past two decades, yet the resources available have not 
increased in line with that expansion. As such, mandate holders today are unable to conduct 
as many country visits as in previous years and are allocated fewer human resources in terms 
of logistical and other support from OHCHR. Almost inevitably the continued quantitative 
expansion of mandates without accompanying increases in resource allocation will negatively 
impact the quality of the work undertaken by individual mandate holders. The increased 
number of mandate holders results in a preponderance of reports that not only need to be 
translated and disseminated but also that need to be discussed in interactive dialogues at 
Human Rights Council sessions. The net result is that there is less and less time and attention 
devoted to any one mandate, thus undermining the impact that mandates holders may have on 
the protection and promotion of specific rights. Taking into account that all of the UN human 
rights activities are allotted a mere 3 percent of the total UN budget, it is clearly unrealistic 
and unfeasible to expect the Special Procedures mandate holders to make any significant 
contribution to topics such as global poverty, climate change, foreign debt that are already 
addressed by specific international institutions with much more directly relevant expertise 
and solid funding. 
 
5.  Concluding Observations  
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Rights proliferation is a significant concern and increasingly is being discussed within the 
human rights community. Special Procedure mandates, despite being ‘soft law,’ provide a 
microcosm for the issue of rights proliferation within the international arena. Exploring the 
creation of these mandates enables greater understanding of whether there is a link between 
forms of governance and the types of rights and mandates that states promote.  
The research findings suggest that there is indeed a prima facie link between forms of 
governance and the types of rights that states support or actively promote through the creation 
of Special Procedures mandates. Factors such as regional and bloc voting as well as vote 
trading, diplomatic negotiations and foreign policy considerations unrelated to human rights 
undoubtedly play a significant role in establishing voting patterns. However, the link between 
governance and voting patterns on SPRs seems to have flown under the radar of practitioners 
and academics but these preliminary findings suggest that they must be included as a factor 
when understanding issues including the proliferation of SPR mandates.  
It is also apparent from the research findings and our analysis that proliferation of 
mandates is having a negative impact upon the special procedure system. At the most basic 
level, because there have not been increased resources to match the increasing number of 
mandates, those mandate holders focusing on tangible violations of tangible rights are able to 
conduct fewer country visits, produce fewer reports and recommendations, and have less time 
to discuss their findings at the Human Rights Council. For example, in the OHCHR financial 
statement for 2012, of the total earmarked funding for specific mandates only 24 percent was 
allocated to CPRs, while ESCRs accounted for 44 percent and ‘Groups in Focus’ received 32 
percent.cl  Allocation of funds to CPR mandates was slightly higher in 2011, accounting for 
36 percent, though still significantly trumped by ESCRs, which accounted for 46 percent 
(mandates on ‘Groups in Focus’ receiving 19 percent of earmarked funding).cli  Another key 
issue arising from mandate proliferation is that the diversion of resources away from 
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traditional rights and onto substantive matters that ought to be addressed by bodies other than 
human rights institutions has shifted the focus away from individuals as rights-holders. The 
newer mandates are designed in such a way as to be able to criticize countries for policy 
programs or interstate relations, or indeed to criticize international institutions. The focus is 
being shifted away from the relationship between states and individuals and onto examining 
state policies and foreign relations. Indeed there is no method for assessing compliance with 
many of the newer rights, particularly TGRs, which leads to problems in terms of protecting 
and promoting rights. These, and other, issues could be potential motivations for some states 
voting for newer mandates if those countries have nefarious reasons for wishing to 
undermine, dilute or significantly alter the international human rights system.  
It becomes apparent, therefore, that there is a strong need for the human rights 
community not to view Special Procedures mandates in a vacuum and to take notice of what 
is occurring within that system. The creation of new mandates is just one example of rights 
proliferation within the international arena, and understanding how and why those mandates 
are being created and the broader impact that they have is key to the ongoing debates about 
the changing nature of international human rights law. 
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and expression, C.H.R. Res. 1993/45, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/45 (Mar. 5, 1993).  
xliii  Introduced by Egypt (on behalf of the Group of African States), Pakistan (on behalf of the OIC 
member states) and Palestine (on behalf of the Group of Arab States) in draft amendment A/HRC/7/L.39, 
debated on 28 March 2008.  
xliv  Cf. S. Parmar, The challenge of “defamation of religions” to freedom of expression and the 
international human rights, 3 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 353-375 (2009). 
xlv  Comments of the Canadian delegate in explanation of vote before the vote, during the 42nd Meeting of 
the Human Rights Council, 28 March 2008. The Audio-visual recording is available as a UN Webcast, video 
on-demand at: http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/c/un-human-rights-council.html.  
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xlvi  Ibid. ‘Instead of promoting freedom of expression, the special rapporteur would be policing its 
exercise. This would be a fundamental change to the mandate and a bad precedent to set for other special 
procedures.’ 
xlvii  Ibid. For example, Slovenia (on behalf of the EU) opined that ‘the focus of the mandate must stay 
centered on its core notion to promote and protect the right to freedom of opinion and expression. The 
amendment before us, L.39. as proposed by the OIC, does exactly the reverse. It shifts the mandate away from 
promoting freedom of expression towards restricting it.’   
xlviii  In favour:  Angola(NF), Azerbaijan(NF), Bangladesh(PF), Bolivia(PF), Brazil(F), Cameroon(NF), 
China(NF), Cuba (NF), Djibouti (PF), Egypt(NF), Gabon(PF), Ghana(F), India(F), Indonesia(PF), Jordan(PF), 
Madagascar(PF), Malaysia(PF), Mali(F), Mauritius(F), Mexico(F), Nicaragua(PF), Nigeria(PF), Pakistan(PF), 
Peru(F), Qatar(NF), Russian Federation(NF), Saudi Arabia(NF), Senegal(PF), South Africa(F), Sri Lanka(PF), 
Uruguay(F), Zambia(PF). Abstaining: Bosnia and Herzegovina(PF), Canada(F), France(F), Germany(F), 
Guatemala(PF), Italy(F), Japan(F), Netherlands(F), Philippines(PF), Republic of Korea(F), Romania(F), 
Slovenia(F), Switzerland(F), Ukraine(F), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland(F).  
xlix  Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression, H.R.C. Res. 16/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/4 (Mar. 24, 2011). 
l  Adverse effects of the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes on 
the enjoyment of human rights, C.H.R. Res. 1995/81, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/81 (Mar. 8, 1995).   
li  Sale of Children, C.H.R. Res. 1990/68, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/68 (Mar. 7, 1990). 
lii  Arbitrary Detention, C.H.R. Res. 1991/42, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1991/42 (Mar. 5, 1991). 
liii  Violence against Women, C.H.R. Res. 1994/45, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/45  (Mar. 4, 1994). 
liv  Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, H.R.C. Res. 6/14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/6/14 
(Sept. 28, 2007). 
lv  See TAN, supra note xl-xlvi inclusive. 
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lvi  The adverse effects of the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes 
on the enjoyment of human rights, C.H.R. Res. 1995/81, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/176 (Mar. 8,1995) 
lvii  Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, C.H.R. Res. 1998/25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/25 (Apr. 17, 1998); 
Right to Education, C.H.R. Res. 1998/33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/33 (Apr. 17, 1998); Adequate Housing as a 
Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, C.H.R. Res. 2000/9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/9 
(Apr. 17, 2000); Right to Food, C.H.R. Res. 2000/10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/10 (Apr. 17, 2000); The 
Effects of Structural Adjustment Policies and Foreign Debt, C.H.R. Res. 2000/82, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/2000/82 (Apr. 26, 2000); Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, C.H.R. Res. 2001/30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/30 (Apr. 20, 2001); Right of 
Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, C.H.R. Res. 
2002/31, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/31 (Apr. 22, 2002); People of African Descent, C.H.R. Res. 2002/68, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/68 (Apr. 25, 2002); Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other 
Business Enterprises, C.H.R. Res. 2005/69, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/69 (Apr. 20, 2005); Human Rights 
Obligations related to Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, H.R.C. Res. 7/22, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/7/22 (Mar. 28, 2008); Cultural Rights, H.R.C. Res. 10/23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/10/23 [2009-
2015] (Mar. 26, 2009); The Human Rights of Older Persons, H.R.C. Res. 24/20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/24/20 
(Sept. 27, 2013). 
lviii  Right to development, C.H.R. Res. 1998/72, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/72 [1998-2010] (Apr. 22, 1998); 
Human rights and international solidarity, C.H.R. Res. 2005/55, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/55 [2005-2014] (Apr. 
20, 2005); Promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, C.H.R. Res. 2005/57, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/2005/57 [2011-2014] (Apr. 20, 2005); Human rights obligations related to the enjoyment of a safe, 
clean, healthy and sustainable environment, H.R.C. Res. 19/10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/19/10 (Mar. 22, 2012). 
lix  Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, C.H.R. Res. 1998/25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/25 (Apr. 17, 1998). 
lx  Question of the realization in all countries of the economic, social and cultural rights contained in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, and study of special problems which the developing countries face in their efforts to achieve these 
human rights, C.H.R. Res. 1998/33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/33 ¶ 6 (Apr. 17, 1998).  
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lxi  Set of Principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity, 
C.H.R. Res. 2004/72, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/72, (Apr. 21, 2004); Contemporary forms of slavery including its 
causes and consequences, H.R.C. Res. 6/14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/6/14, (Sept. 28, 2007); Freedom of 
peaceful assembly and of association, H.R.C. Res. 15/21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/21 (Sept. 30, 2010); 
Promotion of truth, justice, reparation & guarantees on non-recurrence, H.R.C. 18/6, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/18/7, (Sept. 29, 2011). 
lxii  Impunity, C.H.R. Res. 2004/72, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/72 (Apr. 21, 2004). 
lxiii  Human Rights of Migrants, C.H.R. Res. 1999/44, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/44 (Apr. 27, 1999); Human 
Rights Defenders, C.H.R. Res. 2000/61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/61 (Apr. 26, 2000); Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, C.H.R. Res. 2001/57, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/57 (24 April 
2001); People of African Descent, C.H.R. Res. 2002/68, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/68 (Apr. 25, 2002); 
Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, C.H.R. Res. 2004/110, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/DEC/2004/110 (Apr. 21, 2004); Minority Issues, C.H.R. Res. 2005/79, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/79 
(Apr. 21, 2004);  Discrimination Against Women in Law and in Practice, H.R.C. Res. 15/23, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/15/23 (Oct. 1, 2010); The Human Rights of Older Persons, H.R.C. Res. 24/20, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/24/20 (Sept. 27, 2013).  
lxiv  Human Rights of Migrants, C.H.R. Res. 1999/44, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/44 (Apr. 27, 1999); 
lxv  Enforced or involuntary disappearances, C.H.R. Res 20 (XXXVI), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1980/20 
(Feb. 29, 1980), [in operation from: 1980-2014]; Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, C.H.R. Res. 
1982/29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1982/29 (Mar. 11, 1982) [1982-2014]; Torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, C.H.R. Res. 1985/33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/33 (May 29, 1985) [1985-
2014]; Religious tolerance (freedom of religion or belief), C.H.R. Res. 1986/20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/20 
(Mar. 10 1986) [1986-2013]; Sale of Children, C.H.R. Res. 1990/68, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/68 (Mar. 7, 1990); 
Internally displaced people, C.H.R. Res. 1992/73, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/73) (Mar. 5, 1992) [1992-2013]; 
Contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia, C.H.R. Res. 1993/20, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1993/20 (Mar. 2, 1993) [1993-2014]; Promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, C.H.R. Res. 1994/33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1994/33 (Jan. 1, 1994) [1994-2014]; Independence of 
judges and lawyers, C.H.R. Res. 1994/41, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/41 (Mar. 4, 1994) [1994-2014]; ‘Violence 
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against Women, C.H.R. Res. 1994/45, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/45  (Mar. 4, 1994). [1994-2014); Human Rights 
Defenders, C.H.R. Res. 2000/61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/61 (Apr. 26, 2000); Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, C.H.R. Res. 2001/57, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/57 (24 April 
2001) [2001-2013]; Set of Principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat 
impunity, C.H.R. Res. 2004/72, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/72, (Apr. 21, 2004) [2004-2005]; Trafficking in 
Persons Especially Women and Children, C.H.R. Res. 2004/110, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/DEC/2004/110 (Apr. 21, 
2004) [2004-2014]; The promotion and protection on human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering 
terrorism, C.H.R. Res. 2005/80, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/80 (Apr. 21, 2005) [2005-2013]; Contemporary forms 
of slavery including its causes and consequences, H.R.C. Res. 6/14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/6/14, (Sept. 28, 
2007) [2007-2013]; Freedom of peaceful assembly and of association [2010-2013]; Promotion of truth, justice, 
reparation & guarantees on non-recurrence, H.R.C. Res. 18/7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/18/7 (Sept. 29, 2011) 
[2011-2014]. 
lxvi  ‘Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions’, Id.; ‘Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’, Id.; ‘Religious tolerance/freedom of religion or belief’, Id.; and ‘Human rights 
defenders’ Id. 
lxvii  This average is based on the median results for 3 out of the 4 CPR mandates id. that were adopted by 
vote as the voting breakdown for ‘Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions’ Id. is unavailable. 
lxviii  The mandate on ‘The use of mercenaries as a means of impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to 
self-determination’, (9 March 1987, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/16) does not fall readily within any of the three 
categories of CPR, ESCR or TGR given the hybrid nature of this right. For this reason it is not included in the 
data.  
lxix  ‘Human rights and extreme poverty’ Id.; ‘Right to education’ Id.; ‘Adequate housing as a component of 
the right to an adequate standard of living’ Id.; Right to food, Id.; The effects of structural adjustment policies 
and foreign debt/…and other related international financial obligations of states on the full enjoyment of all 
human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, C.H.R. Res. 2000/82, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2000/82 (Apr. 26, 2000) [2000-2014]; Draft optional protocol to the ICESCR, C.H.R. Res. 2001/30, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/30 (Apr. 20, 2001) [2001-2008]; Right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highset 
attainable standard of physical and mental health, C.H.R. Res. 2002/31, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/31 (Apr. 22, 
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2002) [2002-2013]; ‘People of African descent’ Id.; ‘Human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises’ Id.; Human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation, 
H.R.C. Res 7/22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/7/22 (Mar. 28, 2008) [2008-2014]; ‘Cultural Rights’ Id.; and ‘The 
Human Rights of Older Persons’, Id. 
lxx  ‘Right to education' supra note lviii; ‘Human rights and extreme poverty’ supra note lvii; ‘Right to 
food’ Id.; ‘The effects of structural adjustment policies and foreign debt/…and other related international 
financial obligations of states on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and 
cultural rights’ Id.; ‘People of African descent’ Id.; ‘Human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises’ Id. 
lxxi  Based on average of 5 of the 6 mandates as no voting data was available for the ‘Right to education' 
supra note lviii.  
lxxii  ‘The adverse effects of the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes 
on the enjoyment of human rights/sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and waste’ supra 
note lxvii; ‘Right to development’ supra note lvi; ‘Human rights and international solidarity’ supra note lvi; 
‘Promotion of a democratic and equitable international order’, supra note xxxvi [2011-2014]; Human rights 
obligations related to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, H.R.C. Res. 19/10, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/19/10 (Mar. 22, 2012) [2012-2015]. 
lxxiii  ‘The adverse effects of the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes 
on the enjoyment of human rights/sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and waste’ supra 
note lxvii; ‘Human rights and international solidarity’ Id.; ‘Promotion of a democratic and equitable 
international order’ Id.  
lxxiv  Which we set out in detail in a forthcoming article based on this research. 
lxxv  Exceptions include Mercenaries supra and the renewal of Freedom of Expression 2008 supra. 
lxxvi  See Section 5 infra. 
lxxvii  ‘Human Rights Defenders’ supra note lxiii  
lxxviii  Of the 50 states to vote in favor, 26 were F countries: Argentina, Botswana, Canada, Chile, the Czech 
Republic, El Salvador, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mauritius, 
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Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, the United Kingdom and 
the United States; 16 were PF countries: Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, the Congo, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Madagascar, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Zambia; and 8 were NF 
countries: Bhutan, Burundi, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Sudan, Swaziland and Tunisia.  
lxxix  In its annual country report on China in 2000, Amnesty International (AI) highlighted that ‘[t]he human 
rights situation in China deteriorated sharply during the year. Those targeted in the crack-down included 
political dissidents, anti-corruption campaigners, labour rights activists, human rights defenders and members of 
unofficial religious or spiritual groups.’ Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2000 - China, 
including Hong Kong and Macao (Jun. 1, 2000) http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa1138.html. In its report 
on Cuba for 2000, similar concerns were raised by AI again, where it was highlighted that ‘[d]issidents, who 
included journalists, political opponents and human rights defenders, suffered severe harassment during the 
year. Several hundred people remained imprisoned for political offences, some of whom were recognized by AI 
as prisoners of conscience.’ Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2000 - Cuba  (Jun. 1, 2000) 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa0e14.html.  
lxxx  See statement of Mr. Sun Ang, as recorded in the Summary Record of the 66th Meeting of the 
Commission on Human Rights, 26 April 2000, ¶ 69. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/SR.66. 
lxxxi  See statement of Mr. Alfonso Martinez, as recorded in the Summary Record of the 65th Meeting of the 
Commission on Human Rights, 26 April 2000, para. 22. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/SR.65. 
lxxxii  H.R.C. Res. 15/21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/21 (Sept. 30, 2010). 
lxxxiii  Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, 
Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and the United States. 
lxxxiv  Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Georgia, Guatemala, Maldives, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Republic of Moldova, Senegal, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine and FYR Macedonia.  
lxxxv  Somalia. 
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lxxxvi See statements by the Chinese delegate, made during discussion of draft resolution A/HRC/15/L.23 at 
the 32nd Meeting of the Human Rights Council, 30 September 2010. The Audio-visual recording is available as 
a UN Webcast, archived video: http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=100930. 
lxxxvii  See comments by the Russian delegate, ibid, concerning the provisions already provided for under the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Racist Discrimination (ICERD) that e.g. ban activities of 
racist organizations vis-à-vis association and assembly. 
lxxxviii  See comments of the delegates from Libya, Pakistan and Cuba, ibid, vis-à-vis the role of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO).   
lxxxix  Id.  
xc  See Section 5 infra 
xci  See comments made by the Cuban delegate, Id.  
xcii  C.H.R. Res. 1998/25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/25 (Apr. 18, 1998).  
xciii  Argentina, Austria, Botswana, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mali, the Philippines, Poland, 
Republic of Korea, South Africa, the United Kingdom and Venezuela.  
xciv  Bangladesh, Brazil, Guatemala, Indonesia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Ukraine.  
xcv  Belarus, Bhutan, China, the Congo, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Russia, Sudan and 
Tunisia.   
xcvi  Report of the 54th Session of the Commission on Human Rights, 16 March-24 April 1998. U.N. Doc. 
E/1998/23.   
xcvii  C.H.R. Res. 2000/82, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/82 (Apr. 26, 2000). 
xcviii  Bangladesh, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, China, the Congo, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Qatar, Rwanda, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia, Venezuela and Zambia.  
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xcix  Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.  
c  Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Republic of Korea and Russia.  
ci  Botswana, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Mauritius and the Philippines. 
cii  Bangladesh, Brazil, the Congo, Ecuador, Guatemala, Madagascar, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Zambia.   
ciii  Bhutan, Burundi, China, Cuba, Pakistan, Qatar, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland and Tunisia.  
civ  H.R.C. Res. 7/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/7/4 (Mar. 27, 2008).  
cv  H.R.C. Res. 16/14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/14 (Mar. 24, 2011).  
cvi  Cf. Weiss supra note xxi who adopts this terminology to explain the current geopolitical divisions at 
the UN.  
cvii  See the statement made by the Slovenian delegate (on behalf of the EU), during discussion of draft 
resolution A/HRC/7/L.9 at the 39th Meeting of the Human Rights Council, 27 March 2008. The Audio-visual 
recording is available as a UN Webcast, archived video: 
http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=080327. 
cviii  See the statement made by the US delegate, during discussion of draft resolution A/HRC/16/L.18 at the 
46th Meeting of the Human Rights Council, 24 March 2011. The Audio-visual recording is available as a UN 
Webcast, archived video: http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=110324. 
cix  Id.  
cx  C.H.R. Res. 2005/55, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/55 (Apr. 20, 2005). 
cxi  Id.  ¶ 5. 
cxii  See comments by the Cuban delegate during discussion of draft resolution E/CN.4/2005/L.71, as 
recorded in the Summary Record of 58th Meeting of the Commission on Human Rights, 20 April 2005, ¶ 30. 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/SR.58   
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cxiii  H.R.C. Res. 7/5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/7/5 (Mar. 27, 2008); H.R.C. Res. 17/6, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/17/6 (Jun. 16, 2011). 
cxiv   The following WEOG states voted against the mandate: C.H.R. Res. 2005/55 (2005): Australia, 
Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States; 
H.R.C. Res. 7/5 (2008): Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom; 
H.R.C. Res. 17/6 (2011): Belgium, France, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United 
States.  
cxv  As per 2013 Freedom House ranking, of the 33 countries of GRULAC, 22 were classified as F, 10 as 
PF and 1 as NF. See Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2013http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/freedom-world-2013 
cxvi  The following GRULAC states voted for the mandate: C.H.R. Res. 2005/55 (2005): Argentina, Brazil, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador and Mexico; H.R.C. Res. 7/5 
(2008): Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua and Uruguay; H.R.C. Res. 17/6 (2011): 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Uruguay. 
cxvii  See comments by the Dutch delegate (speaking on behalf of the EU) during discussion of draft 
resolution E/CN.4/2005/L.71, as recorded in the Summary Record of 58th Meeting of the Commission on 
Human Rights, 20 April 2005, ¶ 30. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/SR.58.    
cxviii  See the statement made by the Hungarian delegate, during discussion of draft resolution 
A/HRC/17/L.21 at the 33rd Meeting of the Human Rights Council, 16 June 2011. The Audio-visual recording is 
available as a UN Webcast, archived video: http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=110616. 
cxix  Id. 
cxx   H.R.C. Res. 18/6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/18/6 (Sept. 29, 2011). 
cxxi  Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, China, the Congo, Cuba, Djibouti, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Nigeria, the 
Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Thailand, Uganda and Uruguay.  
 43 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
cxxii  Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland, Republic of Moldova, 
Romania, Spain, Switzerland and the United States.  
cxxiii  Chile, Costa Rica, Mauritania, Mexico and Peru.  
cxxiv  Chile, Costa Rica and Peru, accounting for three of the five abstentions.  
cxxv  Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Ecuador, Guatemala, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Maldives, Nigeria, the 
Philippines, Senegal, Thailand and Uganda.  
cxxvi  Angola, Cameroon, China, the Congo, Cuba, Djibouti, Jordan, Qatar, Russia and Saudi Arabia.  
cxxvii  As provided in the preamble of H.R.C. Res. 18/6. 
cxxviii  As proposed by the Polish delegate (on behalf of the EU) in draft resolution A/HRC/18/L.33, 
introduced at the 35th Meeting of the Human Rights Council, 29 September 2011.  
cxxix  Id. See comments by the Polish delegate (speaking on behalf of the EU) during discussion of draft 
resolution A/HRC/18/L.33. The Audio-visual recording is available as a UN Webcast, archived video: 
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/c/un-human-rights-council.html. 
cxxx  See comment made by the Hungarian delegate during the discussion of the mandate on international 
solidarity, Id. at 170.  
cxxxi  See comments made by the Cuban delegate in asking for a vote on draft resolution A/HRC/18/L.13 as 
orally amended by United States. The Audio-visual recording is available as a UN Webcast, archived video: 
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/c/un-human-rights-council.html. 
cxxxii  See comments made by the US delegate, Id.  
cxxxiii  Id. at 135.  
cxxxiv  See e.g., Freedman supra note xxii, 197-252.  
cxxxv  Nigeria is a member of the African Group; Mexico is a member of GRULAC 
cxxxvi  Nigeria is a member of the OIC; Mexico is a member of G8+5  
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cxxxvii  Mexico abstained in the vote in the following: ‘The effects of structural adjustment policies and foreign 
debt’ C.H.R. Res. 2000/82 (2000) and H.R.C. Res. 16/14 (2011); ‘Promotion of a democratic and equitable 
international order’ H.R.C. Res. 18/6 (2011); ‘The adverse effects of the illicit movement and dumping of toxic 
and dangerous products and wastes on the enjoyment of human rights’ C.H.R. Res. 1995/81.  
cxxxviii  See discussion on toxic dumping supra. 
cxxxix  There are some notable examples where Russia and China diverged in their otherwise generally similar 
voting pattern. In C.H.R. Res. 2000/61 ‘Human Rights Defenders’ (2000), Russia voted in favor of the mandate 
while China abstained. The reverse occurred during the vote on C.H.R. Res. 2000/82 ‘The effects of structural 
adjustment policies and foreign debt’ (2000), where it was China that voted in favor of the mandate, while 
Russia abstained. However, the most flagrant break in voting alliance was visible in C.H.R. Res. 1995/81 
‘Adverse effects of the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes on the 
enjoyment of human rights’, where China voted in favor of the mandate while Russia voted against.   
cxl  E.M. HAFNER-BURTON, MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS A REALITY 78 (2013). 
cxli  As has occurred throughout the recent civil war in Syria. 
cxlii  A full list of countries, plus individual reports is available on the mandate’s page: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/IEDebt/Pages/CountryVisits.aspx 
cxliii  The visit was conducted between 28 October and 6 November 2007. The full report is available in U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/7/5/Add.3. 
cxliv  Id. SR on the right to food (28 October - 6 November 2007) U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/5/Add.3  
cxlv  Cuba has still numerous pending requests for country visits on core CPR mandates including: torture, 
freedom of opinion and expression, peaceful assembly and association, and independence of judges and lawyers. 
See full list of accepted and pending requests at the official special procedures page of the OHCHR: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/countryvisitsa-e.aspx.  
cxlvi  See Universal Periodic Review of Cuba, 2nd Cycle, considered on 1 May 2013, Report of the Working 
Group, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/24/16, at  ¶ 170.64. 
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cxlvii  UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food: Mission to Syria from 29 August to 7 September 2010 – 
Available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/docs/SyriaMissionPreliminaryConclusions_07092010.pdf. 
cxlviii  View, e.g., Human Rights Watch report about Syria from 2013 – Available at:  
http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/syria  
cxlix  UN Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health - Visit to Syria, 6-14 November 2010. Preliminary observations available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10532&LangID=E. 
cl  See OHCHR Annual Report, ‘Financial Statements’ at 145: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ohchrreport2012/web_en/allegati/11_Financial_Statements.pdf. 
cli  See OHCHR Annual Report for 2011, ”Financial Statements” at 153: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ohchrreport2011/web_version/ohchr_report2011_web/allegati/17_Financial_Stat
ements.pdf.  
